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Federal Courts-RULES OF CIVILPROCEDURE-POSTJUDGMENT
MOTIONTO INTERVENE
TO APPEALDENIAL
OF CLASSCERTIFICATION
Is T ~ ~ ~ ~ y - U n i Airlines,
ted
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385
(1977).
Prior to 1968 United Airlines required as an employment
condition that its stewardesses, but not its stewards, remain
unmarried. Carole Romasanta filed a federal class action on behalf of herself and all other United stewardesses discharged under
the no-marriage rule, alleging that the rule violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' The district court held that the class
of eligible stewardesses failed to meet the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2and
.~
on
ordered the suit to continue as an individual a ~ t i o nRelying
.,~
the factually similar case of Sprogis v. United Air Lines, I ~ cthe
district court later awarded summary judgment for Romasanta
granting reinstatement and backpay. Thereafter, the parties
,~
eventually settled on the amounts of backpay to be a ~ a r d e dand
the district court dismissed the action with prejudice.
,~
Eighteen days after the district court's d i ~ m i s s a l Liane
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified a t 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to
2000e-15 (1970)). Specifically, g 703(a)(l)of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)(1970), was
alleged to have been violated.
2. Rule 23(a)(l) requires that a class action may only be maintained if "the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."
3. The district court felt that only those stewardesses who had previously filed grievances under United's collective-bargaining agreement or who had filed charges under a
fair employment statute were eligible to participate in a civil action. See Romasanta v.
United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). The court, however, did permit 12 former stewardesses to intervene " 'by way of joinder as additional parties plaintiff.' " Id.
Before a civil action may be filed under Title VII, the plaintiff must first ordinarily
file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e) (1970). In deciding the instant case, however, the Supreme Court stated that
relief under Title VII may be granted on a class basis without requiring that unnamed
class members exhaust administrative procedures. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432
U.S. a t 385, 389 n.6 (1977).
The district court had certified for appeal its order striking the class allegations in
Romasanta's complaint. The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to grant leave t o appeal
the "interlocutory" order. 537 F.2d a t 917 n.3; see 432 U.S. a t 388-89 n.4; cf. 28 U.S.C. §
1292 (1970) (providing for discretionary appeal of interlocutory orders).
4. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U S . 991 (1971). Sprogis was an individual action, not a class action.
5. The district court appointed a special master to recommend each plaintiff's compensation. In determining damages, the parties followed guidelines used in Sprogis. In
Sprogis, the special master had recommended that the plaintiff be awarded over $10,000
in damages. The district court had approved that award, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc.. 517 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1975) (appeal from
district court's judgment approving master's report with respect to damages).
6. This was well within the 30-day period allowed for appeals. See FED. R. APP. P.
4(a).
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Buix McDonald, a putative member of the class defined in the
original Romasanta complaint, moved to intervene solely to appeal the court's denial of class certification. Her motion, filed
three years after class status had first been denied and long after
the applicable limitations period had expired, was adjudged untimely by the district court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding the motion to intervene
untimely.' The appellate court also reversed the district court
order denying class status, holding that exhaustion of administrative procedures was not neces~ary.~
United petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari solely to challenge the ruling on the timeliness
of McDonald's postjudgment application for intervention? The
Supreme Court granted the petition and affirmed, holding that
McDonald's motion to intervene was timely and should have
been granted.

Intervention in the federal courts is governed by Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.loRule 24 provides both for
intervention of right and for permissive intervention. In general,
where "the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede [an applicant's] ability to protect [his interest] relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action," he has a right to intervene under Rule 24(a). On
7. 537 F.2d at 917-19.
8. Id. a t 919-20; see note 3 supra.
9. United did not contest either the holding that its no-marriage rule violated Title
VII or the Seventh Circuit's decision on the merits of the class certification issue. 432 U.S.
at 391.
10. Rule 24 provides:
(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented
by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention.
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have
a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
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the other hand, "when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common," the court
a t its discretion may permit him to intervene under Rule 24(b).
Rule 24(b) also states that "[iln exercising its discretion, the
court should consider whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."

A.

Timeliness and Rule 24

Rule 24 requires that the applications for both intervention
of right and permissive intervention be timely made." Although
the rule does not indicate when an application will be timely, the
Supreme Court has held that whether intervention be of right or
permissive, timeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances "by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on review."12 Although Rule 24 specifically directs the
court to exercise its discretion only in passing on motions for
permissive intervention,13 the timeliness requirement applies to
motions for intervention of right as well as for permissive intervention; courts may thus use their discretion in ruling on motions
to intervene as of right.14 Even an application for intervention of
right may be held untimely in the exercise of the court's discretion, and such determination will not be disturbed on review
unless that discretion is abused. The courts, however, may be less
strict in adjudging the timeliness of interventions of right than in
determining the timeliness of permissive interventions.15
11. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973).
12. Id. a t 366 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the exercise of the trial court's discretion must be viewed "in the liberal atmosphere of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
to be construed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' " McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 1).
13. The discretion granted the courts in the last sentence of Rule 24(b) is not limited
to the timeliness determination. Timeliness is a separate requirement of both subsections
(a) and (b) of Rule 24. The last sentence of Rule 24(b) seems to give the courts added
discretionary authority over permissive Rule 24(b) interventions. As a practical matter,
however, not much is added by this sentence. The criteria of delay or prejudice mentioned
in the last sentence of Rule 24(b) are the principal criteria used in applying the timeliness
requirement of both subsections (a) and (b).
14. See McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1977); Nevilles v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 511 F.2d 303,305 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Kozak
v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1960).
15. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 515 F.2d
946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
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Since the enactment of Rule 24, courts have applied various
criteria in passing on the timeliness of intervention, including
prejudice to existing parties resulting from the delay in moving
to intervene16or from defending against stale claims,17the necessity of the intervention to preserve the applicant's rights,18 the
length of time the applicant knew of his interest in the suit without acting,lgthe extent to which discovery and other pretrial activity would have to be repeated for the i n t e r v e n ~ r and
, ~ ~ the
purpose for which intervention is sought.21The interaction of
these criteria and the various weights given each one depend
heavily on the factual circumstances of each case and the courts'
perception of the proper balance among the interests of the origiA motion
nal parties, the proposed intervenor, and the
to intervene made before much discovery or actual trial of the
issues has occurred will usually be granted even though considerable time has passed since the complaint was filed.23On the other
hand, where intervention is sought just prior to or anytime after
final judgment, the potential for both inconvenience to the court
and prejudice to existing parties suggests that intervention will
be less readily granted.24
Despite its lateness, there are several situations where postjudgment intervention has often been granted. Postjudgment
intervention has been allowed for purposes of appealing the action, especially where the original party stands in a representative
relationship to the intervenor and either refuses to appeal or stops
16. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Smith
Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977).
18. See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970); Wolpe v.
Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944).
19. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Tipco, Inc.,
554 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975).
20. See Iowa State Univ. Research Foundation, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 459 F.2d 447
(8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem.
Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1116 (5th Cir. 1970).
21. Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22. See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970); Kennedy,
Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY.L.J. 329, 330 (1969). The
public's interest is generally in judicial economy.
23. See Note, Intervention of Private Parties Under Federal Rule 24, 52 COLUM.L.
Fhv. 922, 929 (1952).
24. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970). See 3B
fi 24.13[1], a t 24-526 & n.14 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1976-77).
PRACTICE
MOORE'SFEDERAL
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prosecution of the
Postjudgment intervention to assert a
subrogation interest in an undistributed fund has been allowed
because the intervenor "was not attempting to reopen or relitigate any issue which had previously been determined," but was
raising an issue that could not have been considered until the
verdicts had been rendered." In addition to allowing postjudgment intervention to prosecute an appeal or assert a subrogation
interest, courts have allowed postjudgment intervention when a
case is remanded for further proceedings after an appealn or when
the parties affected by a judgment intervene to request a voice
in shaping the relief to be granted.28In all these situations the
intervenor does not seek to consume unnecessary time or expense;
he desires only the chance to continue where the original party
left off.
In contrast to the above situations, postjudgment intervention has been most often denied where the purpose of the intervention was to challenge a consent decree, thus prejudicing the
existing parties by undoing what cost them much time and expense to achieve, especially where the intervenors have known or
should have known of their interest in the action long before they
when an intervenor seeks to raise issues
i n t e r ~ e n e dIn
. ~ general,
~
that could have been resolved through an earlier intervention, his
motion to intervene will be held untimely.30
25. See Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d
505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U S . 777 (1944); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co.
v. Interborough Rapid Transit, 3 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But see Walpert v. Bart,
44 F.R.D. 359 (D. Md. 1968).
26. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. See Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam); Atkins v. State Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1969).
28. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Intervention to gain a voice in shaping
the relief to be granted may not always be postjudgment, but a t best is very late prejudgment intervention.
29. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Alleghany-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 546 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Nevilles v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 511 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
But see Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977) (intervention t o challenge a consent decree allowed when intervenors did not know of their interest in the
action and the district court did not allow notice to be sent); Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d
768 (8th Cir. 1976) (intervention to challenge a consent decree allowed where intervenors
were unaware that their interests were not adequately represented), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
914 (1977).
30. See Iowa State Univ. Research Foundation, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 459 F.2d 447
(8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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B. Timeliness and Statutes of Limitation
One infrequently mentioned but important aspect of the
timeliness issue is the effect that applicable statutes of limitation
have on an intervenor's claim. One article has suggested that
most cases ignore the statute of limitations question and simply
hold the intervention application to be timely or untimely.31This
lack of analysis may not be serious where a court holds an application to be untimely and dismisses it without further comment.
Where, however, a court allows intervention after the statute has
run, the adverse parties should be expected to strenuously obj e ~ t In
. ~fact,
~ in cases where it has been raised, the statute of
limitations issue has been treated seriously, and the point where
found to be well taken, has resulted in a bar to an otherwise
timely i n t e r ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~
The statute of limitations issue is especially important where
intervention is sought in an action filed as a class action but
denied class certification for failure to qualify under Rule 23.34
When class status is denied, the action may continue as an individual action, but all except the named plaintiffs are excluded
and must either file their own actions or attempt to intervene in
the individual action.35Where the statute of limitations has run
after the filing of the class action complaint but before denial of
class certification, all excluded parties will be barred from filing
their own individual actions, and it appears that they can seek
relief only by moving to intervene in the individual action that
was brought before the statute of limitations ran.36
31. Lederleitner & Nolan, Criteria for Intervention, 1967 U . ILL. L.F. 299, 301.
32. The infrequent mention of statutes of limitation may result from the fact that
an intervenor's requisite interest in an action is so similar to the original party's claim
that the intervenor's interest is not considered to be a separate claim subject to the statute
of limitations. See DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826,831 (9th Cir.
19631, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
33. See Jack v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1958); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
34. FED. R. CIV.P. 23(c)(l): "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained."
35. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-53 (1974); 3B
f 23.50, a t 23-1105 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1976-77); Proposed
PRACTICE
MOORE'SFEDERAL
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D.
73, 104 (1966).
36. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974). "[Tlhere is
much in the [American Pipe] opinion that suggests that intervention under Rule 24 is
the only recourse for the class member against whose claim the statute has run during
PRACTICE 7 23.90[3] n.11 (2d ed.
the pendency of the class action." 3B MOORE'SFEDERAL
1948 & Supp. 1976-77).
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In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,37the State of
Utah filed a private antitrust class action eleven days before expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Long after the
eleven days were past, the district court denied class status for
failure of the class to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule
23(a)(1).38Eight days later, sixty of the excluded class members
moved to intervene as plaintiffs in Utah's action. The district
court, without weighing the competing considerations for and
against intervention, found that the intervenors were barred by
the statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that "the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate
for class action status."3gThe Court also ruled, however, that the
limitations period would commence running again after the district court ruled on the suit's class action character. Therefore,
since the class suit was brought by Utah eleven days before the
statute ran, the intervenors had only eleven days after denial of
class status to move for permission to intervene.
There is hope, however, for a member of a class denied class
status even if he fails to intervene in the individual action before
the statute of limitations runs. If the denial of class certification
is reversed on appeal, the status of class members will be determined as of the time the suit was instituted." Thus, the excluded
party will then be a member of the class and will be able to share
in any relief eventually granted the class. In view of the importance to a putative class member, barred from intervening by the
statute of limitations, of having the denial of class certification
reversed where the named plaintiffs have prevailed but have chosen not to appeal the denial of class status, the question inevitably arises whether a postjudgment motion to intervene for the
purpose of appealing this denial of class certification is timely
under Rule 24 and the applicable statute of limitations.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that a postjudg37. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
38. See note 2 supra.
39. 414 U.S. at 553.
40. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 n.14 (10th Cir. 19681, cert. denied, 394 U . S .
928 (1969). See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 433 U.S. 385, 392 (1977); American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
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ment motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the denial
of class certification is timely under Rule 24 if filed within the
time allowed for an appeal prescribed by Rule 4(a) of the Federal
~ ' so holding, the Court first disRules of Appellate P r ~ c e d u r e .In
posed of United's argument that according to American Pipe the
intervention was barred by the expired statute of limitations. In
United's view, Romasanta's class action complaint tolled the
statute of limitations with respect to McDonald but only until the
denial of class status for lack of numerosity. At that time the
statute began to run again with respect to McDonald, so that
when she sought to intervene three years later, she was barred by
the statute of limitations." In responding to this argument, Justice Stewart, also the author of the Court's opinion in American
Pipe, wrote:
This argument might be persuasive if [McDonald] had sought
to intervene in order to join the named plaintiffs in litigating her
individual claim based on the illegality of United's no-marriage
rule, for she then would have occupied the same position as the
intervenors in American Pipe. 43

McDonald's intervention, however, was for the entirely different
purpose of "obtaining appellate review of the district court's
order denying class action status in the Romasanta lawsuit."
Justice Stewart noted that the critical fact was that McDonald sought to intervene as soon as the denial of class status was
appealable and it became clear that the named plaintiffs would
not appeal.14 He observed that postjudgment intervention has
been allowed where "in view of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly after the entry of final judgment."" He also
stated that McDonald was a proper party to appeal since the
statute of limitations had not run against her a t the time the class
action was filed, so that successful reversal of the class certifica41. Rule 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the appellate court within
30 days after the entry of judgment. If, however, the United States is a party, the time is
extended to 60 days.
42. 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975) requires employment discrimination complaints to be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days
of the occurrence of the discriminatory act. Although McDonald did not have to file a
complaint with the EEOC since Romasanta had already done so, see note 3 supra,
United's contention was that she was required to intervene within this 180 day period.
43. 432 U.S. at 392.
44. Justice Stewart noted that "[a] rule requiring putative class members who seek
only to appeal from an order denying class certification to move to intervene shortly after
entry of that order would serve no purpose." The order would not be appealable until after
final judgment. Id. a t 394 n. 15.
45. Id. a t 396.
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tion denial would create a class of which she was a member.
Justice Stewart further reasoned that the defendant United was
not prejudiced by McDonald's late intervention since the lawsuit
had started as a class action, giving United notice of "both the
subject matter and size of the prospective litigation."" Moreover,
although class certification was denied, this did not mean that
the case must be treated as if it had never been filed as a class
action, Justice Stewart observed. United knew that the class certification denial was appealable after final judgment, and its ability to litigate this issue was not prejudiced merely because
McDonald appealed instead of the named plaintiffs.
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent,47argued that the majority opinion supplemented the American Pipe rule with "a
novel tolling rule applicable only to intervention for the purpose
of appealing the denial of class status" and that there was "no
justification for [such an] extension, either in precedent or policy."" Although he acknowledged the fact that intervention was
sought for a purpose different from that in American Pipe, Justice
Powell claimed that the majority had not explained the relevance
of this difference. He challenged the majority's basic assumption
that the filing of a class action, even though later denied class
status, gave the defendant notice of the claims against him and
gave the unnamed class members a right to rely on the named
plaintiff to appeal the denial of class status. Instead, Justice Powell maintained that the denial of class status should strip the
action of its class action character, thereby both putting putative
class members on notice that they may no longer rely on the
named plaintiffs to protect their rights and putting the defendant
on notice that he may rely on settlements with the named plaintiffs to terminate the action. Therefore, once class status is denied, excluded class members must seek to intervene or file their
own actions before the statute of limitations expires, Justice Powell contended. Assuming intervention is sought within the limitations period, the district court would still need to exercise its
discretion in determining the motion's timeliness under Rule 24.
This approach, Justice Powell observed, would help define the
contours of the nonclass action early in the litigation, "thus
speeding its ultimate r e s o l ~ t i o n . " ~ ~
46. Id. at 392-93 (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U S . 538, 555
(1974)).
47. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined Justice Powell's dissent.
48. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 403 (Powell, J., dissenting).

198

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

The Supreme Court allowed Mrs. McDonald to transform an
individual action into a class action after litigation on the merits.
The procedural device she used was a postjudgment intervention
for the purpose of appealing the district court's denial of class
status. This analysis will explain how a motion to intervene after
judgment can be held timely and will examine whether, regardless of the motion's timeliness, such intervention in a plaintiffs'
class action will have a more prejudicial effect on the defendant
than other existing procedures. This section will also show both
that postjudgment motions to intervene for the purpose of appeal
may be timely and that such intervention may transform individual actions into class actions. When such a transformation occurs,
however, it is, as this analysis shows, because of existing rules on
the appealability of class determination orders and not because
of any court-sanctioned laxity or opportunism of unnamed parties
to a denied class action.
A.

Timeliness of Postjudgment Motions to Intervene

1. Statute of limitations

Although both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court
characterized the issue as whether the motion to intervene was
timely under Rule 24, United's first contention was that McDonald's intervention was barred by the statute of limitations because the tolling rule of American Pipe should apply to all class
actions." Under American Pipe, if the class certification fails for
lack of numerosity, "the commencement of the original class suit
tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the
class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has
found the suit inappropriate for class status."51 The American
Pipe rule, however, indicates only when the statute is to be tolled
and not when it will commence running again. This holding thus
could be read as saying that after the statute is so tolled it remains tolled, and timely motions to intervene will be granted any
time the discretionary timeliness requirement of Rule 24 is satisfied.
American Pipe, however, did specify when the statute of limitations would commence running again, but it expressly limited
this pronouncement to an interpretation of section 5(b) of the
50. Brief for Petitioner United Air Lines, Inc., at 10-18.
51. 414 U.S. at 553.
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Clayton
the statute of limitations applicable there. The
Court held that since the Clayton Act required that the statute
of limitations be tolled only during the pendency of government
litigation, "[tlhe same concept leads to the conclusion that the
commencement of the class action in this case suspended the
running of the limitation period only during the pendency of the
motion to strip the suit of its class action ~ h a r a c t e r . "After
~ ~ the
denial of class status, the statute of limitations began to run
again. The American Pipe rule as to when the statute is tolled is
thus considerably broader than the rule as to when the statute
will commence running again." Additionally, the purpose of the
intervention in American Pipe was not to dispute the class action
certification denial as in the instant case; rather, the intervenors'
purpose was to prosecute their individual claims as coplaintiffs.
Since the purpose for which intervention is sought is relevant in
determining whether the motion to intervene could have been
more appropriately made earlier,55American Pipe is not strong
authority for barring intervention in the present case.
American Pipe is, however, illustrative of the courts' power
to toll federal statutes of limitation. In American Pipe, the Court
stated that although statutes of limitation are substantive rights
not extendable by rules of procedure, federal courts are not restricted from holding "that the statute of limitations is tolled
under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative +
purpose."56 Thus, American Pipe, far from being an obstacle to
the holding in the instant case, was actually a step toward the
ruling that the limitations period embodied in federal statutes
may be tolled for other reasons not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
52. 15 U.S.C. 9 16(b) (1970).
53. 414 U.S. at 561.
54. For a strict application of the American Pipe rule as to when the statute of
limitations will commence running again, see Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil
Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975). Monarch, like American Pipe, only concerned 4 5(b)
of the Clayton Act.
The Seventh Circuit in the instant case distinguished American Pipe as follows: "The
specific holding in American Pipe that the statute of limitations . . . begins to run anew
if the motion is denied is not applicable here. The statute of limitations in Title VII actions
is suspended once one member of the class initiates the grievance mechanism." 537 F.2d
at 918 n.6.
55. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see note 62 infra.
56. 414 U.S. at 559.
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Rule 24 timeliness

Although the statute of limitations does not bar intervention
here, motions to intervene must still be timely under Rule 24.57
I t is well established that postjudgment motions to intervene
have been held timely.58It is also true that prejudice to the original parties is perhaps the strongest reason for not allowing late
interventions." In order to understand how a motion to intervene
after judgment can be held timely and therefore not prejudicial
to the original parties, the sources of prejudice to the original
parties that may arise from intervention must be separated. Prejudice to existing parties may arise either frorn the delay in moving to intervene or from the results of the intervention itself. The
Rule 24 timeliness requirement has been applied only to the prejudice arising from the intervenor's delay in moving to intervene,
not to the general prejudice to opposing parties of having an
intervening party's rights asserted against them.60Indeed, any
lawsuit is a great inconvenience and is often "prejudicial" to the
defendant. But such prejudice does not bar lawsuits unless it
results from a delay in bringing the action-delay being defined
by the applicable statute of limitations or the timeliness requirement of Rule 24.
Prejudice from delay in moving to intervene results from
raising new issues that could have been considered earlier? In
order for there to be a delay, there must have been some earlier
time when the issues raised by the intervention could have been
handled. A postjudgment motion to intervene to appeal is not
delayed since there was no earlier time when an appeal could
have been taken.62Intervention for this purpose is no different in
57. See note 10 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
59. See note 16 supra.
60. See Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 1977).The prejudice
to an opposing party caused by having an intervening party's rights asserted against him
should be controlled by the other requirements of Rule 24 that must be met before intervention will be allowed.
61. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
62. Although Justice Powell recognized the majority's distinction between McDonald's purpose in intervening solely to appeal the denial of class status and the purpose in
American Pipe of intervening to litigate as coplaintiffs, he claimed that the majority failed
to explain the relevance of this difference in purpose. Once it is seen that the prejudice
from intervention must result from delay in moving to intervene, the relevance of the
purpose for which intervention is sought becomes immediately apparent. Since delay can
only result from failure to raise an issue that could have been more appropriately raised
earlier, it is necessary to consider the issues sought to be raised, namely the purpose of
the intervention.
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terms of the action's continuity from the prosecution of an appeal
by the original party. No step of the action is repeated or delayed.
The only prejudice an opposing party could claim from a postjudgment motion to intervene to carry forward an appeal would
be that without such intervention he would not have had to defend an appeal or suffer the consequences of a reversal. Such
prejudice, however, does not result from the delay in the applicant's motion to intervene but rather from the effect of the intervention itself. The opposing party should not be able to assert the
prejudicial effects of allowing the intervention as a reason for
holding the motion to intervene untimely. The fact that a postjudgment motion to intervene for the purpose of appeal raises
an issue that could not have been considered earlier clearly shows
that whatever its disadvantages, such a motion is not untimely.63
Perhaps the strongest argument the dissent raised against
the timeliness of this postjudgment intervention was that although intervention to appeal the denial of class status could not
have been more appropriately raised earlier, McDonald could
have moved to intervene to litigate the action as a coplaintiff as
soon as class status was denied. In short, postjudgment intervention to appeal the denial of class status is untimely, since intervention as a coplaintiff could have been sought earlier. Justice
Powell based this argument on the assumption that the denial of
class status "strips" the action of its class action character, thus
putting putative class members on notice that they may no longer
rely on the named plaintiffs to protect their rights and putting
defendants on notice that they may settle with the named plaintiffs. Under this reasoning, the excluded class members must
either intervene as named plaintiffs or possibly file individual
actions soon after the denial of class status.
The majority, on the other hand, assumed that an order denying class status does not mean that the action must be treated
as though a class action had never been brought. Rather, the
filing of a class complaint gives the unnamed class members a
right to rely on the named plaintiffs to appeal the denial of class
status until it becomes clear that the named plaintiffs will not do
63. Although the opposing party may not be able to claim prejudice from the timing
of a postjudgment motion to intervene, the intervenor arguably should not be allowed the
"free ride" that results from allowing the nonadverse party to finance the cost of winning
the lawsuit while permitting the intervenor to reap the benefits of a successful judgment.
This "free ride" prejudice, however, can be alleviated by assigning a portion of the litigation costs to the intervenor. "[Sluch a solution would be an appropriate response to the
'free ride' problem, for it would prevent the problem instead of preventing the
intervention." McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970).
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so, at which time a prompt motion to intervene will be held
timely. Furthermore, the lateness of such intervention should not
prejudice the defendant since he was notified by the filing of the
class complaint of the possible claims against him. In effect, as
Justice Powell pointed out in his dissent, the timeliness of postjudgment intervention to appeal a denial of class status depends
on which assumption as to the consequences of the district
court's denial is adopted.64Although Justice Powell cited several
sources supporting his a s s u m p t i ~ n the
, ~ ~ majority's assumption
seems to be the stronger for two reasons.
First, as long as a denial of class status is appealable, the
unnamed, excluded class members who did not intervene to become named plaintiffs have an interest in the action that only the
named plaintiffs can protect. That interest is having the named
plaintiffs prevail on the merits and appeal the denial of class
status. Assuming the validity of the class, which a reversal on
appeal of the denial of class status would presumably verify, it
would seem that the class members should have some means to
participate in the named plaintiffs' successful judgment. Although they may not rely on the successful named plaintiffs to
bear the time and expense of an appeal, the excluded class members should be able to intervene to appeal the order themselves
as long as the defendant is not prejudiced by the time of such
intervention. Since the defendant received full notice of these
claims against him by the filing of the original class complaint,
and since his ability to defend against the appeal is not affected
by which party appeals, he is not prejudiced by the time the
motion to intervene is made.
Second, if postjudgment intervention for purpose of appeal
were untimely so that only the named plaintiffs could appeal the
class status denial, the named plaintiffs could agree with the
defendant, who had ample notice of the excluded class members'
interest in appealing, not to appeal in return for a much more
favorable settlement than they could otherwise command. In effect, the named plaintiffs would be receiving part of the excluded
64. See 432 U.S. a t 399 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65. Justice Powell relied primarily on the Advisory Committee's Note on the 1966
amendment to Rule 23(c)(l) which said that "[a] negative [class status] determination
means that the action should be stripped of its character as a class action." Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D.
73, 104 (1966). He also relied on the Court's decision in American Pipe requiring the
intervenors to intervene in the individual action before the statute of limitations ran. In
American Pipe, however, the intervenors were not attempting to appeal the denial of class
status, unlike the intervenor in the instant case.
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members' compensation. This is more like a "sellout"66 than a
settlement. On the other hand, if the defendant knew that a
settlement with the named plaintiffs would not end all possibility
of an appeal, he could a t least by settlement end the litigation
as to the named plaintiff. Thus, settlements, which are highly
favored in the law,67would not be significantly deterred. Furthermore, a settlement that only satisfies the named plaintiffs' claims
without eliminating the possibility of a reversal of the class status
denial would be more likely to reflect only the value of the named
plaintiffs' claims and not the additional value to the defendant
of ridding himself of all the excluded class members' claims.
This danger of sellout-type settlements, combined with the
adequate notice the defendant has of the claims of excluded class
members and their strong interest in seeing the class status denial
appealed, indicates that the representative nature of the action
should not end with the district court's denial of class status.
Rather, the action's representative nature should continue a t
least until the putative class members know that the named
plaintiffs will not appeal, a t which time a prompt intervention
should be allowed. Any prejudice to the defendant arising from
such intervention comes not from the timing of the motion to
intervene but from the effects of allowing the intervention.

B. Effects of Postjudgment Intervention
Showing that a postjudgment intervention for purpose of
appeal may be timely does not end the inquiry of whether it
should be allowed. For intervention is only a procedural device to
achieve some other end. Under Rule 24(b), a district court may
deny even a timely motion for permissive intervention where the
intervention would "prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties.'-'68 Since the Federal Rules are to "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
66. See Brief for Respondent Liane Buix McDonald a t 33. This danger was mentioned
by the Seventh Circuit in its reversal of the district court. See 537 F.2d a t 919.
67. See, e.g., Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
68. FED.R. CIV.P. 24(b). See note 13 supra.
The dissent in the instant case accused the majority of eliminating the discretion
accorded the district court which had denied the motion to intervene. Although Justice
Stewart did not specifically address this objection, he did treat it in American Pipe:
"[The district court's] determination was not an exercise of discretion, but rather a
conclusion of law which the Court of Appeals correctly found to be erroneous." 414 US.
at 560. In effect, appellate courts may reverse not only for abuse of discretion but also for
failure to exercise any discretion a t all.
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of every action,"69the effect of procedural rules should be to minimize the possibility of any party prevailing by taking advantage
of a procedural rule and to maximize the probability of a party
prevailing on the basis of his substantive rights. In short, the
desired effect is a procedural balance of power between the opposing parties. Postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appealing a denial of class status should therefore be allowed if such
intervention will preserve the excluded class members' cause of
action without putting the defendant in any worse position than
the existing procedural rules have already placed him.
The effect of a postjudgment intervention by an excluded
class member for the purpose of appealing the denial of class
status will be an appellate review of the class status issue. Such
review may result in a reversal of the class status denial after the
merits of the case have been tried in an individual action. Postjudgment intervention, however, is not the only way that determined individuals may appeal the class status denial and turn
the action into a class action after final judgment. The named
plaintiffs themselves may appeal the denial of class status. A
plaintiff who has not settled with the defendant but has prevailed
on the merits may wish to obtain class status for the action in
order to share attorneys' fees or to generally vindicate his class.
Even if the named plaintiffs do not appeal, there may be numerous parties who filed prejudgment protective motions to intervene
solely to appeal an adverse class determination because they were
not willing to rely on the named plaintiffs' willingness to do
Even if the adverse class determination is never appealed, a
defendant may effectively be made liable to an entire class
through an individual action in two other ways. First, there may
be other parties whose statutes of limitation have not expired who
will file new actions and seek to use collateral estoppel offensively
to win a summary judgment relying on the determination of liability in the first case." Second, there is the possibility that the
court itself may grant class relief. In the Sprogis case, the Seventh
Circuit determined that the district court could use its discretion
in granting relief to the whole class even though the action was
69. FED.R. CIV.P. 1.
70. See note 77 infra.
71. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 934 (1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D.
Wash. 1962), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d
379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Sullivan, The Enforcement of Title VII:
Meshing Public and Private Efforts, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 526-31 (1976).
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an individual
The district court in Sprogis, however, chose
not to grant class relief.73Although this procedure was discredited
in the Fifth Cir~uit,'~
it still remains a possibility in the Seventh
Circuit.
These possibilities make it unrealistic to say that but for
postjudgment intervention to appeal the class status denial, the
defendant would not have to defend every suit as if it were a class
action. Where a defendant has committed an act violating the
rights of a large number of people, there will be potential liability
to all those people. The defendant must therefore vigorously defend the issue of liability even in an individual action because the
existing procedural rules allow other claimants to take advantage
of any determination of his liability. United, the defendant in the
Sprogis case, contested vigorously but unsuccessfully that it had
no liability to stewardesses discharged under the no-marriage
rule. Since then it has rightfully used every legitimate procedural
device in an attempt to reduce the number of plaintiffs able to
benefit from that judgment. To prohibit postjudgment intervention by the plaintiff who chose to win or lose with the class cuts
off a valid claim without eliminating the uncertainty as to the
extent of United's liability.

C. Effect of the Nonappealability of Class Determination
Orders Until After Final Judgment
Much of the uncertainty concerning the defendant's liability
in a plaintiffs' class action could be eliminated by allowing interlocutory appeals of the class certification order. A final determination of the action's class character before adjudication on the
merits would give the defendant a clear picture of his potential
liability and of the parties with whom he would have to settle.
Although Rule 23 mandates that district courts determine class
status as soon as possible, the provision also states that class
determination orders "may be conditional and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits."75 Appellate courts,
therefore, will usually not hear appeals of orders denying class
Where the class determination
status until after final j~dgment.'~
72. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 404

U.S.991 (1971).
73. 56 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
74. See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Go., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971).
75. FED.R. CIV.P. 23(~)(1).
76. See, e.g., Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 907 (1976); Cotten v. Treasure Lake, Inc., 518 F.2d 770 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
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order is not appealable until after final judgment, the defendant
is faced with the possibility of a postjudgment transformation of
an individual action to a class action.
The dissent's approach, barring the use of postjudgment intervention to raise the class status issue on appeal, would have
little impact on the defendant's uncertainty as to the extent of
his liability. Although the dissent's approach would have effectively excluded the intervenor in the present case, it would not
have excluded any intervenor who, immediately after denial of
class status, filed a protective motion to intervene to appeal this
denial should the named plaintiffs fail to do so.77Although the
dissent in the Seventh Circuit's disposition of the case accused
McDonald of "sit[ting] back and allow[ing] others to assume
the costs and risks in prosecuting their individual actions,"78an
intervenor who merely files a protective motion to intervene
should the named plaintiffs not appeal is not exerting a significantly greater effort than one who first intervenes after judgment.
Regardless of any laxity on the intervenor's part, the defendant
is still threatened with a postjudgment transformation of the individual action to a class action because the class determination
order is not immediately a ~ p e a l a b l e . ~ ~

IV. CONCLUSION
The present case, although seeming to stretch the policies of
statutes of limitation and Rule 24 timeliness beyond recognition,
does not represent a radical departure from the current law on the
timeliness of intervention. A motion to intervene solely to appeal
a .denial of class status is timely when made promptly after an
appeal becomes available. Although the effect achieved by such
postjudgment intervention-a postjudgment transformation of
an individual action into a class action-seems unusual, as long
423 U S . 930 (1975). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969). See generally 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL
PRACTICE
7 23.97 (2d ed. 1948 &
Supp. 1976-77);Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations,
70 COLUM.
L. REV.1929 (1970).
77. Both the majority and the dissent in the instant case recognized the possibility
that excluded class members could file a protective motion to intervene solely to appeal
a denial of class status should the named plaintiffs not do so. See 432 U.S. at 394 n.15
(majority opinion), 402 (dissenting opinion).
78. 537 F.2d a t 922 (dissenting opinion).
79. The effect of a postjudgment transformation of a Title VII action to a class action
could be alleviated by limiting the relief in such a case to an injunction against the
discriminatory practice. Only those who intervened before the statute of limitations ran
would be entitled to backpay. Sullivan, supra note 71, at 494.

1891

CASE NOTES

207

as a class certification order is not reviewable until after final
judgment, the mere filing of a class complaint will create a t least
the right to appeal an adverse class determination. Such an appeal may freely be taken by the named plaintiffs and all unnamed
class members who filed protective motions to intervene. Prohibiting the postjudgment intervention would only close the back
door while leaving the front door wide open.

